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Some industries are populated prim arily by diversified firm s, while other
industries are dominated by specialized firms, which are present only i n
such a given industry. In this study, we  analyze what factors determine the
dominance of diversified versus specialized firm s, and its effect on fir m
performance. In line with transaction cost economics, we show that market
concentration and the degree of variability in the diversification pattern of
firms in the industry are negatively a ssociated with the importance of the
activity accounted by specialized fi rms across the 720 industries in ou r
study.  The perform ance  of diversifie d  firms  is greater than that o f
specialized firms, where diversifiers dominate the industry and vice versa.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The dominance of specialized (vs. diversified) firms across industries has not been 
studied, despite its potential contribution to our understanding of vertical integration 
and diversification. As we can see in Table I, most industries are populated only by 
diversified firms (i.e. which compete in more than one industry), while in other sectors 
both specialized and diversified companies compete side to side, and only in a reduced 
number of industries specialized firms fully dominate the industry. Why diversified 
companies dominate some sectors and not others? What are the characteristics of those 
sectors populated by specialized firms? Which type of firm has better performance 
across these different types of industries? This paper is a first attempt to study 
empirically the answers to these questions using as guidance transaction costs 
economics.  
 
At any level of industry definition, firms interact with competitors which may be 
present across multiple industries. Firms can integrate vertically absorbing input 
providers and buyers along the value chain, or horizontally across industries. Since 
Coase, standard economic theory claims that transaction costs are the key variable that 
determines whether markets or hierarchies will govern transactions between industries. 
Basically, if the transaction costs of using the market are large, we are likely to observe 
diversified multi-industry companies; if they are low, we will tend to observe 
specialized companies competing in separate industries. We will apply this rationale to 
understand the relative dominance of diversified versus specialized firms across 
industries. 
 
Drawing from transaction cost economics, we will analyze which type of industries 
may show substantial transaction costs in their relations with other industries, so that 
mostly diversified companies should presumably survive in them. Given the 
impossibility of directly measuring transaction costs between industries, we will focus 
on two variables that may reveal their existence. On the one hand, the number of players 
in an industry indicates the likelihood of small numbers bargaining problem 
(Williamson, 1985) and the resulting higher transactions costs in dealing through the 
market with firms in such an industry. On the other hand, we will study the possible 
existence of market failures through the analysis of a common pattern of diversification 
for the firms in a given sector; thus, if we see that most players in a given industry also 
report operations in a similar group of industries, we may presume that some underlying 
market failure makes efficient to be present in all these sectors at the same time. We 
will investigate empirically the relationship of these two critical structural 
characteristics, which reflect the possible existence of transaction costs, with the 
dominance of specialized firms vs. diversifiers across a large set of industries.  
 
Additionally, we will look into the performance consequences of not using the most 
efficient single vs. multimarket presence. Thus, we will test to what extent, in industries 
dominated by one of these two types of firms, companies of the other type have a 
competitive disadvantage that results in lower financial performance. We believe that 
this approach will bring new light into the important debate around the performance 
consequences of diversification in industrial organization, finance, and strategic 
management. This debate is still open with some scholars claiming that diversification IE Working Paper                                    DE8-117-I                               04 - 02 - 2005 
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reduces firm performance on average (Lang-Stulz (1994), Berger-Ofek (1995) and 
Servaes (1996)), while some recent research argues in favour of a positive effect once 
the endogeneity issue is accounted for, because the decision of firms to diversify may be 
associated with their initial lower performance (Villalonga (2004a); Campa (2002) and 
Graham, Lemmons and Wolf (2002)). In this paper, we argue that the effects of 
diversification can be studied more precisely if we distinguish between industries 
dominated by specialized firms and those dominated by diversifiers.  In contrast to 
previous literature, we claim that the relationship between diversification and 
performance is not homogeneous across industries and rather it crucially depends on 
particular industry characteristics. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we explain the analytical 
framework and formulate the key hypotheses. Section 3 contains the data and variables 
description. Section 4 reports our findings. In the last section, we present our 
conclusions and discuss their relevance for the firm diversification literature. 
 
1.  Understanding Industry Activity Accounted For By Specialized Firms 
In this section, we discuss the key factors that in our opinion may influence the 
probability of observing a larger number of specialized firms competing in a given 
industry (in contrast to diversifiers) as well as the consequences on firm performance. 
As we mentioned earlier briefly, a small number of firms in an industry and their similar 
pattern of multi-industry presence may indicate the existence of transaction costs that 
favour the emergence of diversified firms that displace specialized firms operating in 
such an industry and operating through the market with other firms. Let us analyze in 




There are two reasons that explain why specialized firms might be more efficient 
than multi-industry firms when the industry has a relatively large number of players.  
 
Economists have studied extensively how we get an efficient allocation of resources 
in competitive industries. In these markets, prices follow closely the marginal cost of 
production and firms operating in other stages of the value chain have no incentive to 
integrate towards them. Firms that integrate into competitive industries can hope at most 
to replicate the efficiency level obtained by specialized firms, fully obtainable through 
the price mechanism. Thus, little gains for multi-industry firms can be made through 
integration. Furthermore, integration into a larger entity and the introduction of a new 
layer in the hierarchy could distort the optimal incentives provided by the market
1 
resulting in a destruction of value. Because in highly fragmented markets there is less 
incentive to incorporate these activities within the hierarchy and multi-industry firms 
may even become less efficient than specialized firms, we expect than specialized firms 
will have a relatively larger presence in these markets. 
 
Additionally, following Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985) 
and Hart (1995), firm-specific assets could result into under-investment due to potential 
                                                 
1 For example with the creation of a new principal-agent problem or with the creation of influence costs,  
cost of trying to influence managerial decisions, see Milgrom-Roberts (1992)  IE Working Paper                                 DE8-117-I                             04 - 02 - 2005 
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hold-up problems. In an incomplete contract setting, the ex-ante incentives to make 
firm-specific investments decrease if the owner of the asset does not appropriate the ex-
post quasi-rents of her investment. This problem could be mitigated by reassigning the 
property rights through vertical integration. If this type of problems arises in a buyer-
supplier relationship we could expect a larger likelihood of multi-industry firms in 
industries with higher importance of firm-specific assets
2.  This is, if a company with 
the role of buyer-seller needs to make investments specific to this bilateral relationship, 
we are more likely to observe vertical integration. When we incorporate the role of 
industry concentration in this standard argument regarding vertical integration, we can 
hypothesize a decreasing importance of relationship specific investments when the 
number of companies active in a given industry is relatively larger. In other words: The 
larger the number of players in an industry, the less likely that firm-specific investments 
subject to the type of hold-up problem that we have explained above may exist.  
 
For these two parallel reasons we propose (P1) that in less concentrated 
industries the proportion of industry activity developed by specialized firms will be 
relatively greater. 
 
Homogeneity in the degree of industry diversification 
Ideally we would like to be able to observe directly the existence of “economies of 
scope”
3 across industries, coupled with transaction costs (Teece, 1980; 1982). The 
straightforward hypothesis would be that the existence of economies of scope with other 
industries would predict a larger importance of multi-industry companies in a given 
industry, as long as transaction costs also inhibit using market transactions to share 
activities across firms in these industries. However, since neither economies of scope 
nor transaction costs are easily measurable we follow an indirect approach that we 
explain below.  
 
We conjecture that if there are economies of scope coupled with transaction costs 
between two specific industries, then all firms active in any of these industries could 
take advantage of being present in the other one. Therefore, we should observe most 
firms competing in both industries at once in order to take advantage of these 
economies of scope. Though we can not measure economies of scope directly in our 
multi-industry study, we can indeed observe the extent to which a diversified firm 
operating in a particular industry operates in the same set of industries as other 
diversified firms operating in that same SIC code. With this information we can 
construct a measure of the homogeneity in the degree of diversification of all 
participating companies in a given industry as we do in the next section.  
 
We propose (P2) that in industries in which all firms present a similar pattern of 
diversification, i. e. they are active in a similar set of industries, the proportion of 
activity accounted by specialized firms is going to be smaller, because they cannot take 
advantage of economies of scope of diversifiers. In contrast, if firms in the industry 
present a non-homogeneous pattern of diversification, each one being present in very 
different sets of industries, then there is no evidence of economies of scope, and 
specialized firms would not have a disadvantage over diversifiers. In this case, 
                                                 
2 Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten, S. (1984) and Joskow (1985). 
3 See Panzar (1989)  for a formal definition. IE Working Paper                                   DE8-117-I                              04 - 02 - 2005 
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therefore, we would not expect diversifiers to dominate the industry; specialized firms 
should account for a larger part of the industry. 
 
Performance consequences 
The previous discussion highlights than under certain circumstances, diversifiers 
should be more competitive than specialized firms and vice versa. Multi-industry firms 
that operate in sectors with characteristics that benefit specialization (i.e. industries with 
many competitors and heterogeneous patterns of diversification) should have a 
competitive disadvantage. If we are willing to accept that markets work reasonably well, 
then after some period of time we should observe that these multi-industry firms are 
replaced by specialized firms, which should eventually dominate the industry. By the 
same reasoning, specialized firms that operate in industries in which there are economic 
gains for diversification (i.e. economies of scope along transaction costs) should have a 
competitive disadvantage, and they should be eventually replaced by the multi-industry 
companies that will dominate the industry. 
 
Basically, we argue that diversification is neither good nor bad intrinsically, as 
earlier empirical research on diversification and performance assumed implicitly. In 
some industries, specialized firms will have an advantage over diversified firms and 
vice versa. This is a testable hypothesis that claims that diversified firms should perform 
worse in industries in which specialized companies dominate and, similarly, specialized 
firms should have lower performance in industries dominated by diversified firms (P3).  
 
Control variables 
There are two variables that have been frequently associated with the decisions of 
firms to specialize or diversify: industry size and volatility. Since these variables do not 
affect the relative competitiveness of diversifiers versus specialized firms as we analyze 
in this paper based on the rationale of transaction cost economics, we leave them out of 
our model, but include them in the statistical analysis as control variables. 
 
a) Industry size. Stigler (1951) proposed a well-known model in which the extent of 
vertical disintegration is limited by total market size. In his model, a large demand 
makes profitable the emergence of specialized firms that operate exclusively in one 
stage of the product value chain. For low levels of market size, the existence of these 
specialized firms is not possible since there is not enough volume to cover the fixed 
costs needed to set up independent firms in each step of the value chain. The implicit 
assumption in the argument is that total fixed costs are smaller under a vertical 
integrated firm, but variable costs are higher.  Thus, we will control for the effect of 
market size on industry specialization, expecting that multi-industry companies will 
dominate smaller size industries and specialized companies will have greater presence 
in industries of greater size. 
 
b) Industry volatility. The positive effects of diversification on reducing risk are 
extensively documented in the field of corporate finance
4. However, there are also 
                                                 
4 Even if individual shareholders do not need firm diversification to reduce risk, individual managers may 
still have an incentive to engage in firm diversification policies to reduce their own , see   Amihud and 
Lev (1981).     IE Working Paper                                 DE8-117-I                              04 - 02 - 2005 
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reasons to expect that in highly volatile environments hierarchies will perform worse 
than the decentralized market allocation mechanism. For example, in a standard 
principal agent problem, the risk-adverse agent´s total compensation increases with total 
volatility, making more costly for the principal to implement the optimal level of 
agent´s effort. Furthermore, the higher level of centralization inherent to the hierarchy 
makes the decision process slower and this could result in higher costs in more volatile 
industries for the multi-industry companies. Thus, it is not clear whether diversified 
firms should be more or less dominant than specialized firm in more volatile industries. 
In any case, industry volatility seems to be a potentially important variable with regard 
to diversification and we will include it as a control, though its effect on the 
competitiveness of diversifiers and specialized firms could go either way. 
  
2.  Data and Variable Description  
For operational purposes, we identify an industry as a four-digit SIC code
5 from the 
Compustat database. In 1997, a change in the SEC regulations forced public companies 
to disclose their segment information exactly in the same way as they were internally 
organized. Because this change in SEC regulations about the disclosure of segment 
information could have an important impact in the performance consequences of firm 
diversification
6, we will use data only from 1998 onwards to measure industry 
specialization, that is, the proportion of sales obtained by all specialized firms in a given 
industry (in contrast to the proportion of sales attributable to diversifiers in such an 
industry). 
 
The number of industries in the dataset oscillates between 761 in 1998 and 727 in 
2001, as Table 1.A shows. Most industries are exclusively populated by diversified 
firms, but in close to 40% of the industries in the sample specialized and diversified 
firms compete with each other. Considering all industries, around 12% to 14% of 
overall sales are made by specialized firms, while the rest are attributable to diversified 
firms. These numbers show that diversified firms clearly dominate our economy, though 
there is still an important number of specialized firms competing alongside in their own 
industry against diversifiers. 
 
It should be noted that there may be industries in the large database Compustat in 
which we have just one observation for a single firm.  We might suspect that single-firm 
industries could mislead our conclusions about industry specialization. We checked 
whether the pattern of industry specialization changes when excluding the firms that 
report just one segment. Table I.B shows these descriptive statistics in the reduced 
sample. We lose around 10% of the sample depending on the year, but we can see how 
the percentage of industry activity accounted for by specialized companies does not 
change much; for example in 2001 this percentage was 14% using the whole sample 
and 15% using the restricted sample.  
 
We combine data from different Compustat databases. From Compustat Industrial 
(1998-2001), we take corporate information for all US public companies. We also use 
Compustat Segment (1998-2001) to get business segment data. We cross the 
                                                 
5 We discuss later how our results might change with different industry definitions. 
6 For a description of all imperfections of segment data prior to 1997 see Villalonga (2004b)  IE Working Paper                                  DE8-117-I                              04 - 02 - 2005 
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information from the two data sets using the Standard & Poor’s firm identifier. 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables in year 2001 are shown in Table II. 
 
Percentage of activity accounted for by specialized firms  
There are some segments (four-SIC codes) that we cannot allocate to any industry 
since they do not report their activity with the 4 digit level of detail. We drop these 
observations losing 10% of firms in our sample. We consider specialized firm those that 
operate in only one industry (i.e. business segment) and diversifiers those for which 
Compustat reports data for more than one business segment. Total industry sales is 
computed by adding all individual segment sales of diversifiers plus all specialized firm 
sales operating in such an industry for that year. Once we have this total, we are able to 
compute the share of industry sales accounted for by specialized firms.  
 
Market structure 
For each four-digit SIC code, we add all specialized firms and segments of 
diversified firms that operate in that particular industry in a given year. The sum of both 
categories gives us the total number of players in each SIC code. For example in 2001, 
for the SIC 2013, “Sausage and other prepared meats” there was a total of six players 
operating. Four of them: Bob Evans Farms, Sara Lee Corporation, Atlantic Premium 
and Provena Foods were operating in additional industries like Restaurants, Beverages 
or Household Products. Two of them Bridgeford Foods and Smithfield were operating 
only on “Sausage and other prepared meats”. We can then compute the Herfindhal 
Hirschman Index to measure industry concentration based on segment sales figures to 
obtain market shares.  
 
Variation in the diversification pattern at the industry level 
  The computation of this variable requires detailed explanation. For clarification 
purposes, specific examples are shown in Appendix I. For each possible pair of 
industries we compute the number of firms that are operating simultaneously in both of 
them. As a result we have a symmetric square matrix whose number of rows and 
columns is equal to the number of different industries we have in the sample. Note that 
in the diagonal of this matrix we have the total number of players in each industry. Let 
mij be the element of this matrix located in row i column j, I the total number of 
industries in the sample, Oij is an index function equal to zero if mij =0 and equal to 1 
otherwise. Our measure of homogeneity in the diversification structure of the industry i, 
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If the industry i is populated only by specialized firms then H is assigned a value 
equal to zero. Note that basically H is a measure of the variance of a variable: the 
proportion of firms in industry i that operate in the rest of the industries. 
 
We have defined H such that its maximum value is one, corresponding to the 
situation in which all firms in the industry have the same diversification structure. For 
example, in 2001 for the SIC code 5139 “ Footwear wholesale”, there are only two 
firms active: Genesco and the Weyco Group. Both firms are also operating in only one 
more SIC code 5661, “Shore Stores”. We say that the “Footwear wholesale” industry 
has a homogeneous diversification structure meaning that all units active in this sector 
have the same pattern of diversification. We can check that in (1), both the numerator 
and denominator will be equal to one and as a result H will be one. Instead in SIC code 
1429, “Crushed & broken stone” in 2001 there are two firms: Azco Mining that operates 
only in that industry and Vulcan Material that has also a segment in SIC code 2812, “ 
Alkalies & chlorine”. Therefore for SIC code 1429, the numerator is (1/2)
2 and the 
denominator is equal to 1. As a result, our measure of homogeneity in the 
diversification structure is 0.25.  
 
Industry size 
Total industry size has been measured as total industry sales in a given year adding 
both sales from specialized firms and sales from segments of diversified companies that 
operate in that given industry. 
 
Industry Volatility 
We measure volatility in an industry by the weighted average of firm volatility. The 
weights we use are the market share of each segment. Firm volatility has been computed 
using stock return volatility in the past 60 months.  
 
3.  Results 
Preliminary evidence 
In Table III we can see how it seems to be a negative correlation between our 
measure of the percentage of activity accounted for by specialized firms and both the 
Homogeneity in the diversification structure at the industry level and the concentration 
measured by the Herfindhal Index. On average, in fragmented industries with a non-
homogeneous diversification structure, specialized firms account for 28% of the activity 
while in Homogeneous and Concentrated Industries this number decreases to only 7%.  
 
In Graph 1 and Graph 2 we have more evidence about this negative correlation 
between our dependent variable and both industry concentration and the variation in the 
diversification structure.  
 
Regressions  
We confirm these intuitions regressing the proportion of industry sales by 
specialized firms on the industry concentration ratio and our measure H of homogeneity IE Working Paper                                DE8-117-I                              04 - 02 - 2005 
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in the diversification structure. In Table IV we can see that both independent variables 
are indeed negatively correlated with the relative presence of specialized firms in the 
sample of 720 industries. The Herfindhal Index of industry concentration and our 
measure H of homogeneity of diversification pattern are both negatively correlated with 
the percentage of industry sales from specialized firms.  
 
Note that the variable of homogeneity in the diversification structure has a non-
linear influence with a quadratic term that is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests a possible U form relation between homogeneity in the diversification structure 
and the proportion of activity of specialized firms. In particular, the functional form that 
links the percentage of activity done by specialized firms, Y, and the homogeneity in 
the diversification structure follows is as follows: 
 
Y= -0.83H + 0.70H
2 
And therefore 
dY/dH = -0.83 +1.4H 
 
Note that the homogeneity in the diversification structure only increases the 
importance of specialized firms for those values of H larger than 0.59. Less than 2% of 
the observations have a value of H larger than 0.59
7 and therefore for 98% of the sample 
H has a negative effect on the proportion of activity accounted by specialized firms, as it 
was expected. 
 
Finally, since our dependent variable is constrained by definition to be between zero 
and one, we estimate a non-linear regression that accounts for this fact. In particular, we 
use a functional form Y = 1-1/exp(b0 + Σbixi) that guarantees that the dependent 
variable will only be contained in the interval between zero and one. The results are also 
reported in Table IV and they are qualitatively the same than we found with the simple 
OLS regression
8. As a summary we can conclude that we find strong empirical evidence 
in favor of P1 and P2. 
 
Next, we test P3 using segment ROS as measure of performance
9. Table V displays 
numerically how the relative performance of diversified and specialized companies 
changes dramatically as the proportion of industry sales made by specialized firms 
increases. For those industries in which specialized firms represent less than 60% of 
total sales, diversifiers have much better performance than specialized firms. The 
differences in performance become substantially smaller when specialized firm begin to 
dominate the industry, and eventually specialists achieve slightly greater performance 
than diversifiers in terms of median ROS. This can also be seen in Graph 3. 
 
 These observed patterns could be driven because structural industry differences in 
performance as we claim, but they could also be due to other differences in diversified 
versus specialized companies that influence their financial performance. We tried to 
control for them using standard fixed-effects regression analysis. With this purpose we 
construct a dummy for multi-industry (diversification) equal to one if the firm is active 
in more than one four digit SIC code. Additionally, we define a dummy that has a value 
                                                 
7 In Table II we can see that the mean value of H is 0.17 and the median is 0.04 
8 We also did the regression analysis using dummies for the quartiles of the two key independent 
variables and obtained also a significant negative association with the dependent variable. 
9 We also used ROA as an alternative measure of performance and obtained very similar results. IE Working Paper                                 DE8-117-I                                04 - 02 - 2005 
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of one if the business operates in a four-digit SIC code in which more than 50% of the 
activity, as measured by total sales, is performed by specialized firms. In Table VI we 
regress business ROS on a set of industry dummies, firm size, the diversification 
dummy, and its interaction with the specialized industry dummy. The results confirm 
that diversified firms indeed perform better than specialized industries across the board, 
except when specialized firms dominate the industry, thus supporting P3. 
 
Robustness checks 
Although we have reported the regression with the cross section of industries just 
for the year 2001, our results are qualitative the same in any other given year from 1998 
to 2001. We do not include these results and other robustness checks discussed below in 
the paper to avoid flooding the paper with tables, but these results are available and 
could be requested to the authors. 
 
Another concern is the robustness of our empirical findings to the exclusion from 
the sample of those industries from which we have just a single firm observation. We 
have replicated our analyses in the restricted sample and obtained the same results that 
we have documented in the paper.  
 
Finally, one may have some issues regarding the industry definition we have used to 
construct our industry variables. We have equated industry with a four-digit SIC code. It 
might be too much or too less aggregation. For example, one might wonder about being 
appropriate to consider as diversified a firm that is operating both at SIC 2047 “Dog and 
Cat Food” and SIC 2048 “Prepared Feeds and Feed Ingredients for Animals and 
Fowls”. On the contrary, SIC code 2052 Cookies and Crackers can aggregate two 
industries that have absolutely nothing to do with each other. Again, we have test if our 
results are robust to the use of different industry definitions and we have replicated our 
analysis taking the three digit SIC code as the unit of analysis. Once again, our results 
are qualitatively the same although the statistical significance decreases slightly. 
 
5. Implications for the diversification literature 
This paper provides further empirical evidence of the validity of transaction costs 
economics in understanding the emergence and the efficiency of diversified versus 
specialized firms. We can see that in industries with certain characteristics associated 
with high transaction costs (few players present also in a similar set of other industries) 
diversifiers account for a larger share of sales and have better performance than 
specialists competing in those industries. In contrast, under the opposite circumstances 
specialists have greater presence and achieve greater performance. 
 
The fact that some industries seem to be more favourable environments for 
diversified firms than for specialists and vice versa has important implications for the 
diversification literature. The effect of diversification on performance should not be 
homogeneous across all industries. In other words, there should not be necessarily 
neither a positive nor a negative diversification-performance relationship valid across all 
industries. Whether the performance of a firm entering a new business improves or 
deteriorates depends among other things on the relative efficiency of diversifiers and 
specialists in the two industries involved. If there are significant economies of scope IE Working Paper                                  DE8-117-I                            04 - 02 - 2005 
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and transactions costs between the two business activities, then those firms that are 
present in both industries should have an advantage over specialists and eventually 
come to dominate those industries. Only in these cases, diversification and performance 
will be positively correlated. Keeping this caveat in mind and given the abundance of 
diversifiers in our economy, however, it seems more reasonable to expect a 
diversification premium than a discount, as the most recent research in finance finds 
(Villalonga (2004a); Campa (2002)). In any case, our paper shows that it is the 
underlying industry characteristics what makes diversifiers or specialists more efficient 
and thus the dominant players in an industry. 
 
One caution we should keep in mind when interpreting these findings is our sample 
construction process. We have used information exclusively from public companies. 
Private companies certainly have a different pattern of characteristics than public 
companies. As a consequence, we are measuring with some noise both the total level of 
what we call industry specialization, our dependent variable, and the different industry 
characteristics that form our set of independent variables. As long as these types of 
noises are not correlated among each other, our results would be general, reliable and 
independent of the inclusion of private company characteristics in the analysis. Future 
work should test the robustness of our results to the use of both private and public 
company information to measure the different industry characteristics. IE Working Paper                                    DE8-117-I                             04 - 02 - 2005 
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 APPENDIX 1 
 
In this appendix we provide some examples of hypothetical industries to illustrate how 
our index of homogeneity in the diversification structure works. We consider an 
economy in which there are only three companies: A, B and C; and three sectors: I and 
II and III. We compute our index H for all different possibilities: 
 
Example 1 
  Industry I  Industry II  Industry III 
Company A  X  X  X 
Company B  X  X  X 
Company C  X  X  X 
 
In the first Example we assume that all companies are present in the three sectors. In 
this case our index H would be exactly the same for all three sectors: 
 
 
a = I, II, III 
 
This is, all companies in all sector have a completely homogeneous diversification 
structure and therefore our index obtains a maximum value equal to one. 
 
Example 2 
  Industry I  Industry II  Industry III 
Company A  X     
Company B    X   
Company C      X 
 







A = I, II, III 
Note that we equal it to zero by assumption in our definition of the index.  
 
Example 3 
  Industry I  Industry II  Industry III 
Company A  X  X   
Company B      X 
Company C  X  X  X 
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Note that our index is larger for industries I and II than for industry III since in this last 
industry we have a company that is not present in any of the other industries and 
therefore is less likely that there exists an important economies of scope when operating 
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Table I.A   Descriptive Statistics of industry specialization  
 










types of firms 
Average 
Percentage of 




1998 64  0.6  35  12  761 
1999 64  0.7  35  12  775 
2000 64  0.7  35  13  761 









Table I.B    Descriptive Statistics of industry specialization, only those industries 
with total number of firms larger than one 
 










types of firms 
Average 
Percentage of 




1998 59  0.5  30  14  669 
1999 60  0.5  29  13  677 
2000 59  0.7  30  15  665 
2001 58  0.7  31  15  639 
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics. Industry characteristics, year 2001 
 
  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  Num. of 
industries 
% Sales by specialized firms  0.14  0  0.25  720 
Herfindhal Index  0.50  0.44  0.33  720 
Homogeneity in the diversification 
structure
10 
0.17 0.04  0.30  720 
Industry Sales
11 12738  2098  39230  720 
Volatility
12 0.28  0.24  0.12  720 
Number of firms  13.9  5  32.7  720 
 




                                                 
10 As it has been defined in Section 4. 
11 In Millions of dollars 
12 Standard deviation divided by mean of stock price in the last 60 months. IE Working Paper                                   DE8-117-I                              04 - 02 - 2005 
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TABLE III: Proportion of activity by specialized firms depending on the degree of 
market concentration and the variation in the diversification structure at the industry 








1 Industries with in-sample Herfindhal Hirschman Index larger than 3000, it includes the 
top 50% concentrated four digit SIC industries in the sample. 
2 Industries with in-sample Herfindhal Hirschman Index lower than 3000, it includes the 
50% less concentrated four digit SIC industries in the sample 
3 Industries with in-sample homogeneity index larger than 0.02, it includes the top 50% 
homogeneous four digit SIC industries in the sample. 
4 Industries with in-sample homogeneity index lower than 0.02, it includes the 50% less 
homogeneous four digit SIC industries in the sample. 
 
 
Mean =    7% 
Median = 0% 
Mean =   27% 
Median = 4% 
Mean =   20% 
Median = 3% 
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Graph 1: Average proportion of industry activity accounted by specialized companies as 










Decile of Herfindhal Index
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Graph 2: Average activity accounted by specialized firms as a function of the homogeneity 










Decile of the distribution of the variance in the degree of homogeneous diversification
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Table IV: Explaining the proportion of industry activity accounted for by 
specialized firms, year 2001 
 
 

















































Homogeneity in the 




























2  0.10 0.13  0.13 0.14 - 
N  720 720  720 720 720 
 
Dependent variable for all regressions is the percentage of sales accounted for by 
specialized firms in each of the 720 business segment. 
First four columns are OLS regressions. The last column shows the non-linear 
regression results using the following functional form: 
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TABLE V: Differences in performance as a function of the proportion of industry 
















Mean -27.4%  -0.9%  26.5% 
Median -3.1% 5.9%  9.0% 
Less than 
20% 
N 548  1030  ----- 
        
Mean -29%  0.7%  29.7% 
Median -3.0% 7.3%  10.3% 
Between 
20 % and 
40% N 952  924  ----- 
        
Mean -27.8%  2.4%  30.2% 
Median -0.5% 6.0%  6.5% 
Between 
40% and 
60% N 272  357  ----- 
        
Mean 1.9%  3.0%  1.1% 
Median 3.6% 5.5% 1.9% 
Between 
60% and 
80% N 176  250  ----- 
        
Mean -10.9%  -0.4%  10.5% 
Median 3.5% -1.7%  -5.20% 
More than 
80% 
N 189  81  ----- 
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Less than 20% Between 20% and 40% Between 40% and 60%  Between 60% and 80% More than 80%
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TABLE VI: Differences in performance as a function of the proportion of industry 


























2  0.21 
 
This table shows the results of a OLS regression using Compustat segment dataset 
corresponding to the year 2001. Segments belonging to industries populated only by 
diversified firms or only by non-diversified firms are excluded from the sample. The 
regression has been done with four-digit SIC code industry dummies. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis and have been adjusted to account for firm heteroskedasticity. 
1Dummy equal to one if the segment belongs to a firm that operates in more than one 4 
digit SIC code. 
2Dummy equal to one if the segment operates in a four digit SIC code in which more 
than 50%
13 of the activity, as measured by total sales, is performed by non-diversified 
firms. This is, firms that only operate in that four-digit SIC code. 
3Log of segment sales in year 2000. 
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